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ENDING THE COMMERCIAL SIESTA: 
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EUROPEAN 
UNION DIRECTIVE 2011/7 ON 
COMBATING LATE PAYMENTS IN 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
De hecho tambien, cuando hablamos con [los países 
nórdicos] en Europa, no entienden que hay que crear una 
ley para pagar. Para ellos, pagar es una cosa normal. Se 
hace la factura, se paga, termina del problema.1 
Rafeal Barón, Presidente, Plataforma Multisectorial 
contra la Morosidad 
INTRODUCTION 
n February 16, 2011, The European Union issued Di-
rective 2011/7/EU (“Directive 2011/7”), which is meant to 
combat late payment in commercial transactions.2 The objec-
tive of Directive 2011/7 is straightforward: to encourage enter-
prises and public authorities to pay their invoices on time.3 
While simplistic, the import of the objective and the severity of 
the problem it seeks to address cannot be overstated. At pre-
sent, the average time for payment of invoices for goods and 
services in the EU is fifty-six days for the private sector and 
sixty-five days for the public sector.4 This EU average, howev-
er, is skewed by the abysmal average payment periods in many 
                                                                                                             
 1. Hablamos Con . . . Rafael Barón [Talking to . . . Rafael Barón], (Sur-
Madrid Television broadcast July 13, 2011), http://blip.tv/surmadridtv. “In 
fact, also, when we speak with the Nordic countries in Europe, they do not 
understand why a law must be created so that invoices are paid. For them, 
paying is something normal. The bill is sent, the bill is paid, end of problem.” 
Rafael Barón, President, Platform against Late Payments. Id. The Platform 
Against Late Payments is an organization of over thirty business sectors in 
Spain dedicated to the reduction of payment periods through regulatory re-
form and enforcement. See PLATAFORMA MULTISECTORIAL CONTRA LA 
MOROSIDAD, http://www.pmcm.es (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
 2. Directive 2011/7, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
February 2011 on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions 
(Recast), 2011 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Directive 2011/7]. 
 3. See id. art.1, at 5. 
 4. INTRUM JUSTITIA, EUROPEAN PAYMENT INDEX 2011 4 (2011). 
O
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south European countries.5 Greece and Italy are the slowest 
with regard to settling invoices.6 The average payment period 
in Greece is 110 days for the private sector and 168 days for the 
public sector,7 while in Italy the average payment periods are 
103 days and 180 days for the private and public sectors, re-
spectively.8 Spain is in a similar situation, with an average 
payment period of 99 days for Spanish businesses and 153 days 
for the government.9 
The consequences of late payment can be dramatic. Late 
payments cause approximately one in four bankruptcies in the 
EU, leading to the loss of nearly 450,000 jobs every year.10 For 
businesses that manage to stay afloat, late payment can gener-
ate substantial additional costs, such as essential external fi-
nancing or lost investment opportunities.11 Furthermore, on a 
regional level, the fear and uncertainty surrounding payment 
of bills impedes trade among EU Member States.12 Recognizing 
the negative impact late payment has on the European econo-
my, the European Parliament and Council passed Directive 
2011/7, which, among other things, sets maximum payment 
periods for commercial transactions in an effort to reform the 
payment culture in Europe.13 
But one has to question whether Directive 2011/7 comple-
ments or cripples prior global efforts to harmonize commercial 
sales law. The United Nations Vienna Convention on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (“CISG”) already sets standards, di-
rectly and indirectly, for many of the matters covered in Di-
rective 2011/7, such as when payment becomes due and liabil-
ity for interest.14 Given that twenty-three of the twenty-seven 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 6. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 24. 
 8. Id. at 28. 
 9. Id. at 36. 
 10. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Com-
bating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions (Recast)—Implementing 
the Small Business Act,’ 2010 O.J. (C 255) 42, 43. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 1–15, at 5–8. 
 14. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods arts. 58–59, 79, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CISG]. 
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EU Member States are contracting parties to the CISG,15 
whether and how it interacts with Directive 2011/7 could influ-
ence which regime buyers prefer. Specifically, this Note will 
argue that the EU should have embraced the principles of the 
CISG in Directive 2011/7 because they provide more stringent 
payment standards and are in line with common principles of 
contract law already in force in the EU. 
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the problem of 
late payment in business transactions in the European Union, 
focusing specifically on how the practice hinders the growth of 
national and regional markets. Part II will discuss the legisla-
tive history and main components of Directive 2011/7, high-
lighting the substantive changes it made to its predecessor, Di-
rective 2000/35/EC. Part III will analyze how portions of Di-
rective 2011/7 conflict with the CISG. Finally, Part IV will pro-
vide a critique of Directive 2011/7 through an analysis of the 
EU’s legislative powers and the common core of contract prin-
ciples in the EU. 
I. BACKGROUND AND THE EFFECTS OF LATE PAYMENT 
The title of Directive 2011/7, “On Combating Late Payment 
in Commercial Transactions,” is somewhat misleading. In addi-
tion to discouraging late payment of invoices (i.e., payment 
made after a contractual or statutory period of payment), Di-
rective 2011/7 also seeks to reduce contractual payment periods 
in the first instance.16 Thus, its overall thrust is to create a 
“culture of prompt payment” across Europe to encourage cross-
border transactions.17 
How did the European Union arrive at a need for this legisla-
tion? As will be discussed in Part II, Directive 2011/7 is not the 
first EU effort directed toward the subject of late payment, but 
                                                                                                             
 15. Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the United Kingdom are the only EU 
Member States that are not Contracting States to the U.N. Vienna Conven-
tion on International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). Compare Status: International 
Sale of Goods (CISG), UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_stat
us.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (listing Contracting States to the CISG), 
with European Commission, Countries, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (listing EU Member 
States). 
 16. See 2010 O.J. (C 255), supra note 10, at 44. 
 17. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, preamble, para. 12, at 2. 
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it is the most ambitious.18 In the wake of the current financial 
and economic crisis, the EU has recognized that small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) are vital components of job 
creation and recovery capacity.19 However, SMEs are particu-
larly vulnerable to excessive payment periods20 for two reasons. 
First, SMEs are more likely to accept unjustifiably long pay-
ment periods due to their often inferior bargaining power in 
negotiations with larger entities.21 Second, because of their lim-
ited liquidity, SMEs are more sensitive to the consequences of 
late payment than their larger counterparts.22 Indeed, for an 
SME, the administrative and financial burdens that result 
from long payment periods or late payments can be devastat-
ing.23 Late payment often forces the SME to delay payment to 
                                                                                                             
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions –‘Think Small First’: A ‘Small Business Act for Europe,’ 2009 O.J. (C 
182) 30, 31. 
 20. See The Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia 
Univ., Directive 2000/35/EC on Combating Late Payment in Commercial 
Transactions, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 293, 293 (2001). 
 21. See 2010 O.J. (C 255), supra note 10, at 43. 
 22. See The Parker School, supra note 20, at 293. 
 23. See id. With regard to the financial burden long payment periods im-
pose, the Commission provides an excellent hypothetical to illustrate how the 
speed of payment periods can substantially deteriorate a firm’s cash position: 
Take an example of a medium-sized enterprise with a turnover of 
ECU [European Currency Unit, (precursor to the Euro)] 12 million a 
year. Assuming an even spread of orders throughout the year and 
that invoices will be paid after 30 days, this company will have ECU 
1 million in outstanding invoices each time. Assuming all trade debts 
are fully financed by bank loans, with an interest level of 10% this 
amounts to ECU 100 000 a year in financial costs on outstanding 
debt. If the enterprise has an average margin of 5% (ECU 6000 000), 
the interest on outstanding debt equals 16,7% of the profit. Assume 
now a different situation where invoices on average will be paid after 
90 days. The outstanding invoices then amount to ECU 3 million and 
the financial costs on outstanding debt are 300 000. This equals 50% 
of profits. In other words, an increase in the payment time from 30 to 
90 days takes away one third of the margin. 
Communication from the Commission—Report on Late Payments in Commer-
cial Transactions, 1997 O.J. (C 216) 10, 16. With regard to the administrative 
burden long payment periods impose, the Commission comments, 
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its “suppliers and employees, as well as taxes, duties and State 
and social security contributions.”24 In order to meet its own 
obligations, the SME may have to obtain external financing, 
generating substantial additional costs.25 Increased dependence 
on external financing or the inability to secure external financ-
ing may then lead to the worst-case scenario for an SME—
bankruptcy.26 As noted earlier, late payment causes nearly one 
in every four bankruptcies in the EU.27 
Recognizing the importance of SMEs to the recovery of the 
EU economy, and their need for prompt payment, the Europe-
an Commission (the “Commission”) recommended that the Eu-
ropean Parliament (the “Parliament”) and the Council of the 
European Union (the “Council”) take action to combat late 
payment and reduce payment periods.28 The result was Di-
rective 2011/7.29 
                                                                                                             
Time and manpower have to be spent collecting financial infor-
mation on the solvency of potential customers and on managing out-
standing claims. Legal action may also have to be taken to settle 
disputes. These costs are disproportionately high for SMEs, as they 
do not have specialised staff for debt recovery and the owners often 
have to intervene personally to chase debts. The problems are com-
pounded when the late payer is in another country, and the creditor 
firm has to deal with different legal procedures in the other country. 
Id. 
 24. 2010 O.J. (C 255), supra note 10, at 44. On December 16, 2012, the 
New York Times featured an article pointing out that Spanish employees of-
ten go weeks or months without receiving a paycheck, or even knowing 
whether they will receive a paycheck. Many employers said they wanted to 
pay their employees, but lamented “that their customers frequently pay late, 
or not at all.” Suzanne Daley, For Spaniards, Having a Job No Longer Guar-
antees a Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/world/europe/in-spain-having-a-job-no-
longer-guarantees-a-paycheck.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&smid=fb-share. 
 25. See 2010 O.J. (C 255), supra note 10, at 43. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. at 44. 
 29. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, preamble, para. 3, at 1. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF DIRECTIVE 2011/7 
The first efforts to enact legislation at the EU level on the 
subject of late payments began in 1993.30 In April of that year, 
Parliament adopted a resolution on SME participation in pub-
lic procurement contracts, in which it requested that the Com-
mission submit proposals to deal with the problem of late pay-
ment.31 In November of 1994, Parliament repeated its request 
to the Commission in a resolution on an integrated program to 
favor SMEs.32 In 1995, the Commission responded to Parlia-
ment’s requests by adopting a recommendation on payment pe-
riods in commercial transactions.33 Recommendations suggest 
action but are not legally binding on EU Member States.34 In 
its recommendation, the Commission requested that Member 
States take appropriate measures in accordance with their own 
legal systems to encourage greater transparency of, and adher-
ence to, contractual payment periods in commercial transac-
tions in both the private and the public sectors.35 
This recommendation, however, was ineffective.36 A Commis-
sion report published on July 17, 1997, showed that the rec-
ommendation had done little in the way of reducing late pay-
ments.37 The Commission found that “[i]n most countries . . . 
little or no action ha[d] been taken [to improve the payments 
situation between firms].”38 In fact, the Commission concluded, 
“[a] prudent assessment of the available statistics on payment 
periods for the period 1994-1996 shows that the situation now 
is stable or slightly worse compared to the situation described 
in the recommendation.”39 Foreshadowing this result, Parlia-
                                                                                                             
 30. See Commission Recommendation of 12 May 1995 on Payment Periods 
in Commercial Transactions, 1995 O.J. (L 127) 19 (tracing the legislative his-
tory leading up to the recommendation). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Resolution on the Commission Communication on the Implementation 
of an Integrated Programme in Favour of SMEs and the Craft Sector, 1994 
O.J. (C 323) 19, 21. 
 33. See 1995 O.J. (L 127), supra note 30, at 19. 
 34. See ERIKA SZYSZCZAK & ADAM CYGAN, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW 23 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 35. See 1995 O.J. (L 127), supra note 30, at 19. 
 36. See The Parker School, supra note 20, at 293. 
 37. 1997 O.J. (C 216), supra note 23, at 10. 
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. Id. at 15. Interestingly, the Commission went on to note, “This is all 
the more worrying as payment periods tend to get shorter in times of econom-
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ment had in 1996 expressed doubt as to the appropriateness of 
a non-binding recommendation to ensure reasonable payment 
periods and called on the Commission to transform it into a di-
rective.40 After the dismal 1997 results, the Commission heeded 
Parliament’s suggestion and announced its intention to make a 
proposal for minimum requirements to be incorporated into na-
tional legislation.41 
On March 25, 1998, the Commission adopted a proposal for a 
joint Parliament and Council directive combating late payment 
in commercial transactions,42 which eventually led to the adop-
tion of Directive 2000/35/EC (“Directive 2000/35”).43 Directive 
2000/35 is comprised of eight articles, wherein Articles 3 to 5 
lay out the core provisions targeted toward combating late 
payments.44 In sum, these articles give a creditor a statutory 
right to interest on late payment, retention of title, and accel-
erated recovery procedures for undisputed debts. 
First, with regard to the creditor’s right to interest on late 
payment, interest generally “become[s] payable” thirty days 
after the debtor receives “the invoice or an equivalent request 
for payment.”45 The creditor becomes entitled to such interest 
                                                                                                             
ic growth, and get longer in times of recession. This indicates an underlying 
structural problem which is not linked to business cycles.” Id. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id. at 18. 
 42. See Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Di-
rective Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, at 11–17, COM 
(1998) 126 final (Mar. 25, 1998). 
 43. Directive 2000/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
June 2000 on Combating Late Payments in Commercial Transactions, 2000 
O.J. (L 200) 35 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2000/35]. 
 44. Id. Article 1 outlines the scope; Article 2 defines terms; and Articles 6, 
7, and 8 deal with procedural formalities—transposition into national law, 
entry into force, and addressees respectively. Id.; see also The Parker School, 
supra note 20, at 294. 
 45. Directive 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 3, at 37. Article 3 also provides 
when interest shall become payable in the following scenarios: 
(ii) if the date of the receipt of the invoice or the equivalent request 
for payment is uncertain, 30 days after the date of the receipt of the 
goods or services; or (iii) if the debtor receives the invoice or the 
equivalent request for payment earlier than the goods or the ser-
vices, 30 days after the receipt of the goods or services; or (iv) if a 
procedure of acceptance or verification, by which the conformity of 
the goods or services with the contract is to be ascertained, is provid-
ed for by statute or in the contract and if the debtor receives the in-
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provided: “(i) he has fulfilled his contractual and legal obliga-
tions; and (ii) he has not received the amount due on time, un-
less the debtor is not responsible for the delay.”46 Directive 
2000/35 also sets a minimum rate for the statutory right to in-
terest.47 In its proposal for a directive, the Commission ex-
plained the need for a minimum statutory interest rate: 
If the statutory right to interest is to have a deterrent effect 
and is to provide adequate compensation for being paid late, 
the rate of interest needs to be set at a sufficiently high level. 
In other words, it should be at least as expensive to borrow 
money by paying late than to borrow from banks or other 
lenders at commercial interest rates.48 
Heeding the Commission’s proposal, Directive 2000/35 sets the 
level of interest for late payment at “the sum of the interest 
rate applied by the European Central Bank . . . plus at least 
seven percentage points . . . unless otherwise specified in the 
contract.”49 In addition to interest, the creditor is also entitled 
to compensation for all relevant recovery costs incurred 
through pursuing payment from the debtor, “unless the debtor 
is not responsible for the delay.”50 Finally, Directive 2000/35 
provides that Member States “may fix the period after which 
interest becomes payable to a maximum of 60 days” for “certain 
categories of contracts to be defined by national law.”51 
Second, concerning retention of title, Directive 2000/35 pro-
vides that 
Member States shall provide in conformity with the applica-
ble national provisions designated by private international 
law that the seller retains title to goods until they are fully 
paid for if a retention of title clause has been expressly agreed 
                                                                                                             
voice or the equivalent request for payment earlier or on the date on 
which such acceptance or verification takes place, 30 days after this 
latter date. 
Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. COM (1998) 126, supra note 42, at 7. 
 49. Directive 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 3(1)(d), at 37. 
 50. Id. art. 3(1)(e), at 37. 
 51. Id. art. 3(2), at 37. 
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between the buyer and the seller before the delivery of the 
goods.52 
However, given that Member States differ with regard to the 
legal requirements relating to retention of title, sellers still 
have to use different clauses to ensure the effectiveness of 
those clauses in different Member States.53 In this respect, Di-
rective 2000/35 does not substantially affect the administrative 
burden the seller bears in becoming familiar with another 
Member State’s legal procedures.54 Nevertheless, as one scholar 
notes, “the incorporation of an important proprietary element 
in a European regulation is in itself a revolutionary develop-
ment.”55 
Finally, Directive 2000/35 requires Member States to develop 
accelerated recovery procedures for unchallenged claims.56 The 
Commission estimated that about 90 percent of cases seeking 
debt recovery in commercial transaction are undisputed.57 Pro-
vided that the debt is not disputed, Directive 2000/35 requires 
Member States to “ensure that an enforceable title can be ob-
tained, irrespective of the amount of debt, normally within 90 
calendar days of the lodging of the creditor’s action or applica-
tion at the court or other competent authority.”58 Accelerated 
recovery procedures benefit creditors in that “they are rapid, do 
not involve the intervention of a judge . . . and involve few for-
malities and little cost.”59 The Commission hoped that such 
procedures would give the creditor confidence to pursue the 
debtor in the debtor’s Member State, where a writ of execution 
can be enforced almost instantaneously, as opposed to attempt-
ing to sue the debtor in the creditor’s country of residence, 
which can lead to long delays in execution of judgment.60 
These three provisions of Directive 2000/35—entitlement to 
interest, the retention of title, and rapid recovery procedures—
are the “pillars” of the legal regime designed to combat late 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. art. 4(1), at 37. 
 53. See J. Michael Milo, Retention of Title in European Business Transac-
tions, 43 WASHBURN L. J. 121, 138 (2003). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Directive 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 5, at 38. 
 57. COM (1998) 126 final, supra note 42, at 8. 
 58. Directive 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 5(1), at 38. 
 59. COM (1998) 126 final, supra note 42, at 8. 
 60. Id. at 9. 
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payment in commercial transactions.61 Directive 2000/35 re-
quired Member States to transpose these provisions into their 
national laws and regulations by August 8, 2002.62 However, its 
shortcomings became apparent in the wake of the 2008 eco-
nomic crisis.63 In a proposal to recast64 Directive 2000/35, the 
Commission noted: 
[D]espite Directive 2000/35/EC, many businesses, in particu-
lar SMEs, do not charge interest when entitled to do so, which 
in turn decreases the motivation of debtors to pay on time . . . 
In addition, several key provisions of the Directive are un-
clear or difficult to implement in practice.65 
The Commission found that late payment in commercial trans-
actions continued to be a general problem in the EU, in part 
due to the deficiencies of Directive 2000/35.66 The Commission 
commented that the problem was especially pronounced among 
public administrations in a number of Member States and crit-
icized them as “displaying particularly bad payment behav-
iour.”67 The Commission was particularly concerned about the 
failure of Directive 2000/35 in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis 
because the risk of bankruptcies resulting from late payment of 
invoices “strongly increases in periods of economic downturn 
when access to financing is particularly difficult,” and “[t]here 
were signs that [that] ha[d] started to happen as the current 
                                                                                                             
 61. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions (Recast) 
- Implementing the Small Business Act, at 4, COM (2009) 126 final (Apr. 8, 
2009). 
 62. Directive 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 6, at 38. 
 63. See COM (2009) 126 final, supra note 61, at 2, 4. 
 64. The Commission explains,  
Recasting is like codification in that is [sic] brings together in a sin-
gle new act a legislative act and all the amendments made to it. The 
new act passes through the full legislative process and repeals all 
the acts being recast. But unlike codification, recasting involves new 
substantive changes, as amendments are made to the original act 
during preparation of the recast text. 
Recasting, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/recasting_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 65. COM (2009) 126 final, supra note 61, at 4. 
 66. See id. at 3–4. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
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economic crisis unfold[ed].”68 Because of these concerns, the 
Commission sought to recast Directive 2000/35 to introduce 
additional tools for combating late payments.69 
The result was Directive 2011/7. In the recast, the three main 
pillars of Directive 2000/35 persist more or less unaltered.70 
The substantive changes to the directive relate primarily to 
shortening payment periods for public administrations, ex-
panding entitlement to compensation for recovery costs, and 
strengthening unfair contractual terms.71 For example, in 
business-to-government transactions, Directive 2011/7 imposes 
a maximum statutory period for payment. Where the debtor is 
a public authority, Member States must ensure that the period 
for payment does not exceed thirty days, with limited excep-
tions.72 The preamble comments that this payment period is 
appropriate given that public authorities have more secure 
revenue streams and can obtain financing at more attractive 
conditions than a private enterprise.73 While the preamble gen-
erally advises that Member States should ensure that “as a 
matter of principle, invoices, including to SMEs, for supplies 
and services are paid within one month to ease liquidity con-
straints,” Directive 2011/7 does not require a comparable max-
imum thirty-day payment period for business-to-business 
transactions.74 
With regard to recovery costs, Directive 2011/7 ensures that 
where interest for late payment becomes payable in accordance 
with its provisions, the creditor is entitled to obtain from the 
debtor a fixed sum of forty euros.75 The creditor is also entitled 
to any recovery costs in excess of forty euros that were incurred 
as a consequence of the debtor’s late payment, including, but 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4, 9, 10, at 5–8; see also COM 
(2009) 126 final, supra note 61, at 8. 
 71. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 4(3), 6, 7, at 6–7. 
 72. See id. art. 4(3)(a), at 6. For transactions involving a public authority 
that carries out economic activities of an industrial or commercial nature by 
offering goods or services on the market as a public undertaking or a public 
entity that provides healthcare, Member States may extend the period for 
payment by the public authority to the creditor up to a maximum of sixty 
calendar days. See id. art. 4(4), at 6. 
 73. See id. preamble, para. 23, at 3. 
 74. See id. preamble, para. 7, at 2. 
 75. See id. art. 6, at 7. 
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not limited to, hiring a lawyer or a debt collection agency.76 The 
goal of this provision is not only to enable the creditor to recov-
er administrative costs related to late payment, but also to act 
as a further deterrent to debtors, since they will be liable for 
recovery costs in addition to interest.77 Finally, Directive 
2011/7 strengthens provisions about grossly unfair contractual 
clauses.78 For example, a contractual term or practice which 
excludes interest for late payment,79 or which excludes com-
pensation for recovery costs, is presumed to be grossly unfair.80 
Grossly unfair contractual terms or practices are unenforceable 
or give rise to a claim for damages.81 
Member States are required to bring into force the national 
laws necessary to comply with Directive 2011/7 by March 16, 
2013.82 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECTIVE 2011/7 AND THE 
CISG 
A. Intra-EU Transactions for the Sale of Goods: Which Law 
Governs? 
Within the EU, a cross-border transaction for the sale of 
goods may be subject to the provisions of two separate legal re-
gimes, Directive 2011/7 and the CISG.83 The CISG regulates 
international transactions for the sale of goods84 and applies 
when a contract for a sale of goods exists between parties 
whose places of business are in different countries that are sig-
natories to the CISG (the “Contracting States”),85 or when the 
                                                                                                             
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. preamble, para. 19, at 3; COM (2009) 126 final, supra note 61, 
at 8–9. 
 78. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, preamble, para. 12, art. 7, at 2, 7. 
 79. Id. art. 7(2), at 7. 
 80. Id. art. 7(3), at 7. 
 81. Id. art. 7(1), at 7. 
 82. Id. art. 12, at 8. 
 83. CISG, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 84. Id. preamble, art. 1; see also JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE 
CISG 1 (3d ed. 2008). 
 85. CISG, supra note 14, art. 1(1)(a). For example, imagine seller (S) does 
business in Country A, and buyer (B) does business in Country B. Both Coun-
try A and B are Contracting States to the CISG. If S and B enter into a con-
tract for a sale of goods, by default the sale will be governed by the CISG. See 
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rules of private international law result in the application of 
the law of a Contracting State.86 
To be clear, neither the CISG nor Directive 2011/7 intends to 
address all contractual issues associated with international 
sales.87 Additionally, some matters may be covered by Directive 
2011/7 but not the CISG,88 and vice versa.89 There are, howev-
er, provisions of Directive 2011/7 and the CISG that do overlap, 
namely those governing when payment by a buyer becomes due 
and when or whether a buyer becomes liable for interest.90 The 
questions this Note seeks to address are how those overlapping 
provisions interact, and how the outcome of their intersection 
may incentivize buyers to prefer one law over the other. 
A threshold issue in attempting to answer how these over-
lapping provisions interact concerns the status of directives 
adopted by Parliament and the Council. Some scholars argue 
that EU directives are “international agreements” within the 
                                                                                                             
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 3. As of November of 2012, 78 States have 
adopted the CISG. See Status, supra note 15. 
 86. CISG, supra note 14, at art. 1(1)(b). Private international law governs 
which law will apply when parties to a private transaction are from different 
countries, and the domestic laws of those countries conflict. To illustrate, im-
agine seller (S) does business in Country A, and buyer (B) does business in 
Country B. Country A is a Contracting State to the CISG; Country B is not. If 
S and B enter into a contract for a sale of goods, and the rules of private in-
ternational law dictate that the law of Country A applies, then the CISG will 
govern. If, however, the rules of private international law dictate that the law 
of Country B applies, then the contract will be governed by the domestic sales 
law of Country B. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 3. 
 87. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 22. 
 88. For example, Directive 2011/7 covers transactions for the provision of 
services, as well as the delivery of goods. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 
1(2), 2(1), at 5. The CISG, however, covers only contracts for the sale of goods. 
CISG, supra note 14, art. 1. Other examples are questions concerning con-
tract validity and title to property in the goods sold. Generally, the CISG is 
not concerned with “the validity of the contract or any of its provisions,” nor 
“the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.” 
CISG, supra note 14, art. 4. Directive 2011/7, on the other hand, contains 
provisions dealing with the retention of title, see Directive 2011/7, supra note 
2, art. 9, at 8, and the validity of certain contractual terms, such as terms 
that exclude interest for late payment, id. art. 7, at 7. 
 89. For example, the CISG, but not Directive 2011/7, contains provisions 
governing the contract formation process, e.g., whether there has been an 
offer and an acceptance. CISG, supra note 14, arts. 4, 14–29; see also 
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 6. 
 90. See infra Parts III.B.1–3. 
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meaning of CISG Article 90,91 which provides that the CISG 
“does not prevail over any international agreement which . . . 
may be entered into and which contains provisions concerning 
the matters governed by this Convention, provided that the 
parties have their places of business in States parties to such 
agreement.”92 Consequently, these scholars conclude that direc-
tives prevail over the CISG.93 Other scholars contend, however, 
that directives do not qualify as “international agreements,” 
but rather “result in EU Member States having the same or 
closely related legal rules on matters governed” by the CISG, as 
provided for in Article 94.94 This latter view is the predominate 
one.95 According to this predominate view, in order for rules 
harmonized at the EU level by operation of a directive to apply 
by default over the CISG, EU Member States must make a 
formal declaration to the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions.96 No such declaration has ever been made.97 Therefore, 
given that all but four EU Member States are Contracting 
States to the CISG,98 the CISG applies by default to most intra-
EU trade in goods.99 
Nevertheless, many of the rules laid out in Directive 2011/7 
will apply to intra-EU trade in goods, despite the CISG’s 
preemptive authority. First, there are some matters addressed 
in Directive 2011/7 that are simply outside of the scope of the 
CISG, such as the retention of title and the validity of certain 
                                                                                                             
 91. See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Late Payment Directive 2000/35 and the 
CISG, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 125, 128 n.18 (2007). 
 92. CISG, supra note 14, art. 90. 
 93. Viscasillas, supra note 91, at 128 n.18. 
 94. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Global Uniform Sales Law—With a European 
Twist? CISG Interaction with EU Law, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 
179, 190 (2009). Article 94(1) states, “Two or more Contracting States which 
have the same or closely related legal rules on matters governed by this Con-
vention may at any time declare that the Convention is not to apply to con-
tracts of sale or to their formation where the parties have their places of 
business in those States.” CISG, supra note 14, art. 94(1). 
 95. Schroeter, supra note 94, at 190. 
 96. Id. at 190–91. 
 97. Id. at 190; Status, supra note 15. 
 98. Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the United Kingdom are the only EU 
Member States that are not also Contracting States to the CISG. See supra 
text accompanying note 15. 
 99. The CISG applies unless parties affirmatively agree to opt out of the 
CISG regime. CISG, supra note 14, art. 6; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 27 
n.113. 
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contractual terms.100 When an issue is not governed by the 
CISG, courts and arbitrators must resort to domestic rules of 
law,101 which in the cases of EU Member States include trans-
posed provisions of directives. Therefore, sellers can rely on the 
protection afforded by those provisions regardless of which re-
gime governs their transaction with a buyer. 
Second, Directive 2011/7 also addresses some matters that 
are “governed” but not “expressly settled” in the CISG, most 
notably the matter of interest rates. In a “governed-but-not-
settled” situation, a court or arbitral tribunal must first deter-
mine whether the matter can be resolved in conformity with a 
“general principle” on which the CISG is based.102 If the matter 
cannot be settled by CISG general principles, courts and arbi-
trators must rely on supplementary domestic rules.103 One per-
sistent governed-but-not-settled problem arising under the 
CISG is determining the appropriate rate of interest in cases 
where payment of interest is due.104 Because judges must re-
sort to domestic law on this matter, the transposed provisions 
of Directive 2011/7 requiring Member States to fix the level of 
interest for late payment will govern. Consequently, creditors 
with a claim against a buyer for late payment are guaranteed 
to recover at the statutory interest rate provided by Directive 
2011/7, irrespective of whether the transaction is governed by 
domestic law or the CISG. 
Sellers of goods in the EU, then, can assume that certain 
safeguards of Directive 2011/7 will always be available to them. 
A seller may retain title to goods until those goods are paid for, 
defend against unfair contractual terms, and receive a fixed 
rate of interest for payment past due. All of these provisions 
are designed to insulate sellers from, and thus allay their fears 
of, late payment. A question remains, however, as to how these 
provisions impact a buyer’s payment behavior. Certainly the 
prospect of paying a high interest rate discourages late pay-
ment by buyers. Prior to Directive 2000/35, the applicable rate 
of interest for late payment varied among EU Member States 
and was often lower than the commercial rates charged to bor-
                                                                                                             
 100. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 101. LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 22. 
 102. CISG, supra note 14, art. 7; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 39. 
 103. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 38. 
 104. See id. at 41. 
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row money from banks or other lenders.105 By making late 
payment more expensive than a commercial loan, Directive 
2011/7 should impact the behavior of those buyers who view 
late payment as a means of cheap financing. 
However, the interest rate is only one factor impacting the 
cost of paying late. Other considerations include: (1) when 
payment is deemed past due, (2) when interest begins to ac-
crue, and (3) the likelihood of being found liable for that inter-
est. Both the CISG and Directive 2011/7 have provisions con-
cerning these matters. In this situation, where a matter is gov-
erned by both the CISG and domestic law, even if that domestic 
law is implemented per the instruction of a directive, the CISG 
prevails.106 Furthermore, since EU Member States have not 
made a CISG Article 94 declaration that the CISG should not 
apply to terms addressed by directives, the preemptive authori-
ty of the CISG on these subjects seems guaranteed. Yet there is 
an important caveat. In accordance with the principle of free-
dom of contract, CISG Article 6 provides parties whose transac-
tion would normally be within the scope of the CISG with the 
power to partially or wholly contract out of its provisions.107 
Thus, in determining whether to opt out of the CISG, a buyer 
contracting with a seller in another EU Member State who is 
also a Contracting State may consider how each regime im-
pacts the cost of late payment. Since late payment has plagued 
the EU despite the presence of the CISG, one might expect that 
Directive 2011/7 would impose standards stricter than, or at 
least as strict as, the CISG on these points so as not to incen-
tivize buyers to opt out of the CISG in order to obtain more fa-
vorable treatment. However, this is not the case.108 
B. Directive 2011/7 Versus the CISG 
1. When Payment Becomes Due 
The first point of comparison between Directive 2011/7 and 
the CISG is the default payment period established under each 
regime. That is, in the absence of an agreement between the 
parties, when does payment become due under Directive 
                                                                                                             
 105. 1997 O.J. (C 216), supra note 23, at 10, 12. 
 106. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 107. CISG, supra note 14, art. 6; see also LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 27. 
 108. See infra Part III.B. 
2013] COMBATING LATE PAYMENTS 715 
2011/7, and how does that compare to the CISG? Unfortunate-
ly, Directive 2011/7 tacitly condones a longer default payment 
period than would be permissible under the CISG. 
Directive 2011/7 does not explicitly establish a default pay-
ment period. Rather, it implicitly creates one through its provi-
sions governing when a seller becomes entitled to interest. Un-
der Directive 2011/7, when parties do not fix a date or period 
for payment in the contract, “the creditor is entitled to interest 
for late payment . . . 30 calendar days following the date” on 
which the debtor receives the invoice, or where that date is un-
certain, “30 calendar days after” the buyer receives the 
goods.109 As one scholar noted, because a breach of contract 
cannot constructively occur until interest becomes payable, Di-
rective 2011/7 in effect grants the buyer a default payment pe-
riod of thirty days.110 The Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion (“ECJ”) in Telecom GmbH v. Deutsche Telekom confirmed 
this reading, concluding that the directive “la[id] down . . . a 
period for payment of 30 days to be applicable in the absence of 
any contractual agreement . . . .”111 
This default thirty-day delay in payment that Directive 
2011/7 grants to a buyer lays in stark contrast to a buyer’s 
payment obligations under the CISG. Under the CISG, where a 
contract is silent as to the date or period for payment, “[the 
                                                                                                             
 109. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(b)(i)–(ii), at 5–6 (emphasis 
added). 
 110. Viscasillas, supra note 91, at 132, 134. In his article, Viscasillas ana-
lyzes the language of Article 3 of Directive 2000/35, see id., the predecessor to 
Directive 2011/7, which provides that where the parties do not fix a date or 
period for payment in the contract, “interest shall become payable” after the 
expiry of the same time limits provided in Directive 2011/7. Compare Di-
rective 2000/35, supra note 43, art. 3(1)(b)(i)–(iv), at 37, with Directive 
2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(b)(i)–(iv), at 5–6 (stating instead that the “cred-
itor is entitled to interest” after the expiry of one of the specified time limits). 
Presumably, a creditor is entitled to interest when such interest becomes 
payable. Thus, the change in language from Directive 2000/35 to Directive 
2011/7 should not alter the substantive meaning of the provision, and an 
analysis applied to Article 3(3)(b) of Directive 2000/35 should apply equally to 
its correlative provision in Directive 2011/7. 
 111. Case C-306/06, Telecom GmbH v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 2008 E.C.R. 
I-01923, para. 22. In Telecom, the ECJ was interpreting Article 3(1)(b)(i) of 
Directive 2000/35. This interpretation should equally apply to the related 
provision in Directive 2011/7 because, although different language has been 
employed, the substance of the regulation remains the same. See supra note 
110. 
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buyer] must pay [the price] when the seller places . . . the goods 
. . . at the buyer’s disposal in accordance with the contract and 
this Convention.”112 Thus, in a sale governed by the CISG, 
payment becomes due as soon as the buyer receives the goods, 
not thirty days later.113 This rule reflects a general principle of 
synallagmatic contracts in civil law or bilateral contracts in 
common law114 that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed, the parties are 
to exchange their performance obligations at the same point in 
time.”115 The CISG then gives the seller a right to demand im-
mediate payment from the buyer.116 Directive 2011/7, however, 
does not give the seller that right; rather, it obliges the seller to 
grant the buyer at least thirty days of credit.117 
Even more disquieting is that Directive 2011/7 appears to al-
low Member States to create a default payment period of up to 
sixty days for business-to-business transactions.118 Article 3(5) 
provides, “Member States shall ensure that the period for pay-
ment fixed in the contract does not exceed 60 calendar days, 
unless otherwise expressly agreed in the contract and provided 
it is not grossly unfair to the creditor within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 7.”119 The plain meaning of this provision is not readily 
                                                                                                             
 112. CISG, supra note 14, art. 58; see also LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 95. 
 113. See id. 
 114. LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 95. 
 115. Id. A synallagmatic contract is “[a] contract in which the parties obli-
gate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation of each party is correla-
tive to the obligation of the other . . . . The term synallagmatic contract is 
essentially the civil-law equivalent of the common law’s bilateral contract.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added). For examples 
of this principle in common law, see U.C.C. § 2-310(a) (2012) (“[P]ayment is 
due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods”) or the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 28 (U.K.): 
Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the 
price are concurrent conditions, that is to say, the seller must be 
ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in ex-
change for the price and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay 
the price in exchange for possession of the goods. 
Id. 
 116. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 95. 
 117. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(b), at 5–6; Telecom, Case 
C-306/06 at para. 22; Viscasillas, supra note 91, at 132. Although Viscasillas 
analyzed the language of Directive 2000/35, his analysis should apply to Di-
rective 2011/7. See supra note 110. 
 118. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(5), at 5–6. 
 119. Id. 
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discernible. At first glance, Article 3(5) seems to establish a 
ceiling, placing a limit on the duration of a payment period to 
which parties may agree. If this was the case, Directive 2011/7 
would be more rigid than the CISG in this regard, as the CISG 
places no comparable limit on the parties’ freedom to contract 
for longer payment periods. However, this most likely is not the 
case. After seemingly imposing a limit on maximum contractu-
al payment periods, Article 3(5) of Directive 2011/7 goes on to 
say, “unless otherwise expressly agreed in the contract.”120 If 
parties can agree to payment periods longer than sixty days, 
albeit conditioned upon the terms not being grossly unfair to 
the creditor,121 then the first clause of Article 3(5) cannot be 
interpreted to establish a maximum contractual payment peri-
od. Instead, it appears to grant Member States the discretion to 
implement a default payment period of sixty days for business-
to-business transactions. This is precisely how Spain has inter-
preted this provision.122 On July 5, 2010, in anticipation of Di-
rective 2011/7, Spain passed Ley 15/2010, which incrementally 
decreases the default statutory payment periods in transac-
tions between businesses as follows: eighty-five days until the 
close of 2011; seventy-five days during 2012; and sixty days be-
ginning in 2013.123 
If EU Member States interpret Article 3(5) as authority to 
implement default payment periods of sixty days, at what point 
does a creditor become entitled to interest for late payment? As 
previously discussed, Directive 2011/7 provides that, where the 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. See id. In determining whether a contracted payment period is grossly 
unfair to the creditor, a court should consider all circumstances, including 
“(a) any gross deviation from good commercial practice, contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing; (b) the nature of the product or service; and (c) whether the 
debtor has any objective reason to deviate from . . . the payment period as 
referred to in Article 3(5) . . . .” Id. art. 7(1), at 7. 
 122. See B.O.E. 2010, 163 art. 1 (Spain). 
 123. See id. art. 1 (Spain). (“El plazo de pago que debe cumplir el deudor 
será . . . [s]esenta días después de la fecha de recepción de las mercancías o 
prestacíon de los servicios.”) (“The period for payment that the debtor must 
comply with shall be . . . sixty days after the date of receipt of the goods or 
provision of services.”). Notably, although permitted by Article 3(3)(b)(b) of 
Directive 2011/7, Spain prohibits the possibility of parties agreeing to a pay-
ment period longer than 60 days. Id. (“Este plazo de pago no podrá ser ampli-
ado por acuerdo entre las partes.”) (“This period for payment cannot be ex-
tended by agreement between the parties.”). 
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date or period for payment is not fixed in the contract, the cred-
itor becomes entitled to interest thirty days after the buyer re-
ceives an invoice or the goods.124 But if domestic law dictates a 
default payment period of sixty days, it would be illogical to 
answer that a creditor still becomes entitled to interest for late 
payment thirty days after the buyer receives the invoice or the 
goods if payment is not even considered late until after sixty 
days. Thus, Article 3(5) allows for a scenario whereby, under 
domestic law, the seller not only has no right to claim interest 
for late payment until sixty days after he delivers the invoice or 
goods, but also has no right to even expect payment in the first 
place until after the expiry of that period. This potential for a 
default payment period of sixty days is a drastic departure 
from the seller’s right to demand immediate payment under 
the CISG, and is quite remarkable for a measure that purports 
to combat late payments. 
2. When Interest Begins to Accrue 
It should come as no surprise that the question of when pay-
ment becomes due and the question of when interest for late 
payment begins to accrue are closely related. On the latter 
question, similar to what has been shown for the former, Di-
rective 2011/7 puts the creditor in a less favorable position 
than that which he would be in under the CISG. 
The date from which interest begins to accrue under Di-
rective 2011/7 is ambiguous. Although Article (3)(3)(b) clearly 
states that, when a contract is silent on the date or period for 
payment, “a creditor is entitled to interest for late payment” 
thirty days after the buyer receives the invoice or the goods,125 
that the creditor has a claim to interest as of that date does not 
necessarily mean that interest begins to accrue as of that date. 
It is plausible that interest begins accruing as of some earlier 
date, but a claim to the interest does not ripen until thirty days 
after the indicated events occur. Provided, however, that Arti-
cle 3(3)(b) refers to the creditor being entitled to interest for 
“late” payment,126 and that the ECJ has relied on this provision 
to conclude that payment is not considered late until thirty 
                                                                                                             
 124. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(3)(b), at 5–6. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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days after the buyer receives the invoice,127 the reasonable con-
clusion is that this is also the date as of which interest begins 
to accrue. Under Directive 2011/7, the default rate at which in-
terest for late payment accrues for business-to-business trans-
actions is at least as high as the rate charged by commercial 
lenders.128 But the threat of a high interest rate will only affect 
a buyer’s payment behavior insofar as he believes he will be-
come liable for paying it. If a buyer’s potential liability for in-
terest does not begin until at least thirty days after the seller 
performs, it is impractical to believe that the threat of a high 
interest rate will persuade buyers who are intent on paying 
late to consider paying before then.129 
The CISG, on the other hand, is clearer about when interest 
begins to accrue. Under the CISG, interest begins to accrue as 
of the date payment was due.130 Because, provided the contract 
does not specify otherwise, the buyer must pay the price when 
the seller places the goods at his disposal,131 interest for late 
payment begins to accrue from the day on which this event oc-
curs.132 As explained previously, since the rate of interest is a 
matter governed-but-not-settled under the CISG, courts and 
arbitrators will resort to domestic law to determine the appli-
cable rate.133 Because all EU Member States must transpose 
the provisions of Directive 2011/7, the domestic rules of each 
Member State will dictate that the applicable rate of interest 
for late payment in business-to-business transactions is the 
rate applied by the European Central Bank plus at least eight 
                                                                                                             
 127. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 128. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 2(5)–(7), 3(3)(a)–(b), at 5. 
 129. According to the 2011 European Payment Index, compiled by Intrum 
Justitia, 63% of European businesses believe late payment is intentional. 
INTRUM JUSTITIA, supra note 4, at 4. 
 130. See CISG, supra note 14, arts. 58, 78; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 
138. Article 78 provides, “If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum 
that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, without preju-
dice to any claim for damages recoverable under Article 74.” CISG, supra 
note 14, art. 78. The term “sum that is in arrears” implies “that interest ac-
crues as of the date the payment of the ‘sum’ in question is due.” LOOKOFSKY, 
supra note 84, at 138. Although a U.S. Federal Court has interpreted Article 
78 in this manner, other national courts may adopt a more narrow interpre-
tation. Id. However, as Lookofsky points out, a narrower reading of Article 78 
is not supported by CISG or policy reasons. Id. 
 131. See CISG, supra note 14, art. 58; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 95. 
 132. LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 138. 
 133. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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percentage points.134 As a result, a seller will be awarded the 
same rate of interest for late payment under the CISG as under 
Directive 2011/7. Given that a seller’s entitlement to the inter-
est would ripen at least thirty days faster under the CISG than 
under Directive 2011/7, the directive seems to sell creditors 
short on the issue of interest as well. 
3. Liability for Interest 
The question of when interest for late payment begins to ac-
crue, however, only has relevance insofar as a buyer is liable 
for that interest. Here, again, Directive 2011/7 is substantially 
weaker than the CISG. Under Directive 2011/7, a creditor has 
a claim to interest for late payment when, “(a) the creditor has 
fulfilled its contractual and legal obligations; and (b) the credi-
tor has not received the amount due on time, unless the debtor 
is not responsible for the delay.”135 This final proviso may be 
troubling to a seller, as Directive 2011/7 provides no guidance 
as to how to determine whether a debtor is responsible for the 
delay in payment.136 What if a debtor delayed payment because 
he was unsuccessful in obtaining external financing, or because 
he was insolvent? Would either of these scenarios result in a 
debtor being deemed “not responsible for the delay”? Directive 
2011/7 does not provide a clear answer. 
The CISG, on the other hand, provides a simple answer to the 
questions above: “no.” Under the CISG, a buyer is strictly liable 
for interest for late payment.137 Even if the buyer qualified for 
the narrow force majeure exemption provided for in CISG Arti-
cle 79, he would only be exempt with regard to a claim for 
damages; he would not be exempt from a claim to interest.138 
Thus, on the issue of liability for interest for late payment, 
debtors would likely receive more favorable treatment under 
                                                                                                             
 134. See Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, arts. 2(5)–(7), 3(3)(a)–(b), at 5. 
 135. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 3(1), at 5 (emphasis added). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See CISG, supra note 14, arts. 61, 78–79; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 
150, 154–56. 
 138. See CISG, supra note 14, art. 79(5); LOOKOFSKY, supra note 84, at 150, 
154–56. Force majeure is “[a]n event or effect that can be neither anticipated 
nor controlled. The term includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods and hurri-
canes) and acts of people (e.g., riots, strikes, and wars).” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 718 (9th ed. 2010). 
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the provisions of Directive 2011/7, with its potential escape 
valve, than under the strict liability standard of the CISG. 
C. Intra-EU Transactions for the Sale of Goods: Which Law is 
More Favorable to Buyers? 
In summary, Directive 2011/7 provides buyers with more le-
niency in matters concerning payment and interest than the 
CISG. To be sure, Directive 2011/7 has many laudable aspects 
that aid in alleviating the problems of late payment: the seller 
has the power to retain title in the goods until they are paid for 
in full;139 clauses excluding interest for late payment or com-
pensation for recovery costs are presumed to be grossly un-
fair;140 and when found liable, the buyer must pay the seller at 
a default interest at least as high as that charged by commer-
cial lenders.141 Collectively, these provisions aid in bolstering 
the seller’s confidence in a cross-border transaction for a sale of 
goods and dissuading the buyer from attempting to negotiate 
long payment periods or paying late. Nonetheless, as evidenced 
by its comparison to the CISG, Directive 2011/7 falls short on 
pivotal matters influencing a buyer’s decision to pay, namely 
when payment becomes due, when interest begins to accrue, 
and liability for interest.142 Consequently, instead of imposing 
strict sanctions on buyers of goods who choose to pay late, Di-
rective 2011/7, in several regards, provides buyers with a more 
favorable environment in which to conduct their intra-EU 
transactions than the current default law, the CISG. Since 
most EU Member States are also Contracting States to the 
CISG,143 one might question why Parliament and the Council 
shied away from adopting a directive that would require Mem-
ber States to implement equally, if not more, stringent stand-
ards than those they have already agreed to under the CISG. 
As discussed below, this is the path the EU could have and 
should have taken in recasting Directive 2000/35. 
                                                                                                             
 139. Directive 2011/7, supra note 2, art. 9, at 8. 
 140. Id. art. 7, at 7. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 142. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1–3. 
 143. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF DIRECTIVE 2011/7 
A. Limits on the EU’s Legislative Powers 
Before critiquing the manner in which the EU addressed the 
transition from Directive 2000/35 to Directive 2011/7, it is im-
portant to understand when the EU can act. There are three 
principles that limit the legislative powers of EU institutions. 
First is the principle of conferral. Similar to the enumerated 
powers in the U.S. Constitution, the principle of conferral, 
found in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), 
gives the EU power to “act only within the limits of the compe-
tences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties 
to attain the objectives set out therein.”144 The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) clarifies these 
competences, distinguishing between areas in which the EU 
has exclusive competence and competences that the EU shares 
with Member States.145 
The second and third principles are subsidiarity and propor-
tionality, also found in TEU Article 5. In essence, the premise 
behind subsidiarity is that, when exercising a shared compe-
tence, the EU should only act if the Member States acting on 
their own cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives of the pro-
posed action.146 The principle of proportionality then requires 
that when acting the EU “not exceed what is necessary” to 
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achieve the objectives.147 The ECJ uses all three of these prin-
ciples when reviewing legislative actions of the EU. 
B. The Power to Harmonize National Laws to Ensure the Func-
tioning of the Internal Market 
1. The Breadth of the Power to Harmonize 
Turning to the legal basis for Directive 2011/7, Parliament 
and Council use TFEU Article 114, which gives them the power 
to adopt measures for the harmonization of national legislation 
that “have as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market.”148 The internal market of the EU is “an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”149 Without 
more, TFEU Article 114 appears to give the EU broad power to 
act to harmonize Member State laws in the name of achieving 
the internal market. After all, the very existence of more than 
twenty different national legal systems operates as a barrier to 
cross-border transactions.150 However, in 2000, the ECJ in Case 
C–376/98 (“Tobacco Advertising I”) delineated the extent of this 
power.151 The ECJ held: 
“[A] measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a [now TFEU 
Article 114] of the Treaty must genuinely have as its object 
the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. If a mere finding of dispar-
ities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obsta-
cles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or distortions of 
competition liable to result there from were sufficient to justi-
fy the choice of Article 100a [now TFEU Article 114] as a legal 
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basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper legal ba-
sis might be rendered nugatory.”152 
In other words, the EU does not have a general power to regu-
late the internal market; instead, it must show that diverging 
legal rules create a specific obstacle to the functioning of the 
internal market and that its harmonization action aims to 
eliminate it.153 
2. Harmonization and Contract Law 
The Tobacco Advertising I decision seems to make clear that 
the EU cannot adopt a wholesale harmonization of contract 
law. However, that does not mean that the EU cannot act se-
lectively where differences in contract law are shown to impede 
the internal market. Indeed, the EU has issued at least twelve 
directives, including Directive 2011/7, in the field of contracts, 
all with Article 114 (ex Article 95 TEC) as their legal basis.154 
Furthermore, limits on comprehensive harmonization have 
not stopped the EU from investigating its possibility. In 2003, 
the Commission issued an “Action Plan” on “A More Coherent 
European Contract Law.”155 In the Action Plan, the Commis-
sion announced its intention to finance extensive research in 
order to develop a “Common Frame of Reference” (“CFR”).156 
The CFR was to be based on existing national legislation, the 
case law of national courts, the existing EC acquis,157 and rele-
vant binding international instruments, most notably the 
CISG.158 The pronounced goal of the CFR was to serve as guide 
to European legislators in drafting and revising law, and to po-
tentially serve as an optional instrument by which parties may 
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choose to govern their contractual relations.159 In 2009, a Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) was published by a 
large international network of legal scholars.160 The DCFR con-
tains “principles, definitions and model rules” of European pri-
vate law.161 To date, however, the DCFR remains solely an ac-
ademic text; neither the Parliament nor the Council has adopt-
ed a “political” CFR.162 Nevertheless, the DCFR has been re-
garded as a restatement of the common core of the national 
private laws in Europe and of the EC acquis.163 
3. Common Core of Contractual Payment Obligations 
Relevant to Directive 2000/35, the DCFR speaks directly to 
the contractual obligations of time of payment and liability for 
interest. On time of payment, the DCFR adheres to the syn-
allagmatic principle, stating, “If the order of performance of 
reciprocal obligations cannot be otherwise determined from the 
terms regulating the obligations then, to the extent that the 
obligations can be performed simultaneously, the parties are 
bound to perform simultaneously unless the circumstances in-
dicate otherwise.”164 On liability for interest, the DCFR recom-
mends strict liability, providing, “If a payment of a sum of 
money is delayed, whether or not the performance is excused, 
the creditor is entitled to interest on that sum from the time 
when payment was due to the time of payment . . . .”165 Thus, 
the DCFR closely mirrors the principles embodied in the CISG 
on these two questions. 
C. The EU Should Have Used the DCFR to Enact More Strin-
gent Payment Standards 
When Parliament and the Council were recasting Directive 
2000/35, they had the DCFR at their disposal. In fact, the 
DCFR states that it “is intended to help . . . in drafting any fu-
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ture EU legislation in the field of private law. By teasing out 
and stating clearly the principles that underlie the acquis, the 
DCFR can show how the existing Directives can be made more 
consistent.”166 Yet Parliament and the Council chose not to em-
brace the model rules contained in the DCFR or the similar 
principles embodied in the CISG when recasting Directive 
2000/35. While the principles of subsidiarity and proportionali-
ty place a limit on EU action, these principles would not have 
acted as a barrier to the EU imposing more exacting standards 
for payment behavior, such as those embodied in the DCFR or 
the CISG, on buyers involved in intra-EU trade in goods. 
With regard to the principle of subsidiarity, neither Directive 
2000/35 nor the previous Commission recommendation result-
ed in improved payment behavior or shortened contractual 
payment periods. These dual failures strongly suggest that 
Member States could not sufficiently achieve these goals acting 
on their own. Indeed, the Commission relied on this reasoning 
to justify the need for further EU-level action in its proposal for 
a recast of Directive 2000/35.167 In taking additional action, the 
EU incorporated provisions on unfair contractual terms and 
compensation for recovery costs into Directive 2011/7. Given 
the scale of the previous failures, however, the EU would have 
been warranted in going even further and strengthening provi-
sions on when payment becomes due and when and whether 
interest for late payment accrues, especially since these consid-
erations influence when a buyer decides to pay. Therefore, the 
principle of subsidiarity likely would not have acted as a barri-
er to these actions. 
Finally, in keeping with the principle of proportionality, re-
quiring Member States to bring their default contract law in 
line with the DCFR and CISG principles via a directive would 
not have exceeded what was necessary to combat late payment. 
Both a recommendation and a less stringent directive had 
failed to combat late payment; thus, a more exacting directive 
would have been a simple and rational next step. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that late payment is imposing substan-
tial costs on European businesses, particularly on SMEs, a sec-
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tor of the economy that the Commission has identified as cru-
cial to Europe’s economic recovery.168 While Directive 2011/7 
attempted to address some of the deficiencies of its predecessor 
Directive 2000/35, it left lax provisions addressing some of the 
pivotal factors that buyers will consider in determining when 
they should pay invoices. The EU should have and could have 
embraced the contractual principles governing payment obliga-
tions found in the CISG when recasting Directive 2000/35. The 
CISG sets more stringent standards for payment behavior and, 
as shown by the DCFR, represents the common framework 
within which most Member States already operate. 
It is important to remember, however, that these standards 
represent default rules. This Note does not suggest that the EU 
should infringe on parties’ freedom to contract. The freedom to 
contract, however, does not obviate the need for a stronger de-
fault regime, not simply because a default regime is important 
in the regulation of payment behavior, but also because, to 
some extent, it represents normative values. In many regards, 
what is required to change payment behavior in the EU is a 
culture shift,169 and that shift should begin with more exacting 
default payment standards at the EU level. 
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